DevHeal Research / DH-ADOM

Bound authority at every handoff.

The method requires least privilege, explicit delegation and reviewable evidence. Runtime integrations are responsible for enforcing those requirements.

White paper 1.1 · Publication package 1.1.1 · 7 October 2026

Design controls.

  • Keep identity distinct from the underlying model.
  • Limit child authority to the approved delegation.
  • Bound depth, parallelism, time, cost and tool access.
  • Require policy approval for production actions and authority changes.
  • Validate outputs and preserve evidence before integration.

Implementation boundary.

The reference policy demonstrates a subset of these checks. Production adoption needs sandboxing, filesystem scope enforcement, runtime metering, durable audit storage, timeout handling and review of denied actions.

Evaluate these controls in your deployment environment; the source package is not a security certification.

Authority passes through a bounded delegation contract to the child agent.
Controls describe the intended design, not a claim of complete runtime enforcement.
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Threat model and trust boundaries.

Protected assets include repository integrity, credentials, external systems, budgets and evidence. Trust boundaries separate user intent, model output, repository content, delegated agents, the host authorizer, tools and durable audit storage. The following are design controls to implement and test in the host; the demo does not enforce the complete model.

ThreatFailure modeControl to validate
Prompt injectionTool output or repository text tries to redirect an agent.Treat external content as data; authorize actions independently of model text.
Context poisoningA handoff supplies false goals, approvals or results.Validate provenance, scope and evidence before resuming.
ImpersonationAn agent claims a trusted role or parent identity.Bind identities to host authentication and verified delegation records.
Privilege escalationA child requests tools or paths beyond its contract.Intersect delegated permissions with host policy; reject self-escalation.
Scope confusionA task crosses another feature owner’s boundary.Enforce path and resource boundaries; require cross-feature review.
Recursive delegationRepeated spawning exhausts time, cost or workers.Meter depth, concurrency and runtime; enforce termination.
Audit manipulationActions or outcomes are omitted or rewritten.Use durable append-only audit storage with access controls.
Tool abuseAn authorized tool performs unintended external effects.Mediate side effects; require approval for consequential operations.
Stale stateOld ownership or policy records drive new decisions.Version state and verify freshness before authorization.
Root or Feature compromiseA coordinator misuses its authority across its governed scope.Constrain coordinator privileges and use independent approval and revocation.

Diagram

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